Transnational Threats (TNT) and CA Implications

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Future Landscape (Trends) of Transnational Threats

- Continued globalization of economy, information and technology
- No match for U.S. conventional forces
  - Search by many for asymmetric response to US military dominance
  - WMD and covert actions
- Transnational threat will become more significant
  - Diminished authority and capacity of governments beleaguered by population explosion and transmigration, domestic disorder, ethic conflicts, and failed state services

Asymmetric Attack by Nonstate Actors

DSB Core

- Terrorism
- WMD
- Info War

Other

- Drugs
- Organized Crime
- Arms trafficking
- Refugees
- Environ damage

Some CA Challenges

- WWII mindset - Armageddon
- Functional specialties
- Force structure
- Intel avoidance
- Info Opns/War avoidance

Path of Rectitude

- Orient on TNT vice MTW
- Fix the force structure
- Support tactical warfighter
- Consequence Mgt expertise
- Embrace intel roles
- Active involvement in IO/IW

SOF FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The Nature of Future Violent Conflict

As the millenium approaches, high-level American planning for future military conflict remains rooted in the conventional model and the experience of the Gulf War. Despite strenuous efforts to anticipate changes, the US Department of Defense sees future military conflict as conventional warfare, upgraded and improved by computer-driven information systems. This is reflected in a series of "vision statements" from the various US military services all tending toward the concept of future combat as rapid, large-scale and high technological. The idea of a high tech military future is based on the belief that the US will continue to fight Desert Storm-style, more-or-less conventional wars. If you believe that, the high-tech approach makes a lot of sense.

Unfortunately it contradicts virtually every prediction about both domestic and international security threats in the near term future. Observers from all fields are nearly unanimous in their belief that U.S. military forces will be deeply involved in the same morass of near-war or low intensity conflicts that have characterized the past fifty years. Military forces will be required to cope with a fast-changing political, economic and technological environment. Many, perhaps most, commentators (including some inside the DOD) believe that significant security threats will not be confined to big, easily identifiable enemies, but are more likely to arise from smaller, nimbler, and well-armed enemies who will fight "asymmetrically" -- attacking in ways that offset conventional military superiority.1 The kind of large-scale conventional mechanized combat presented in the various "vision" statements has happened to America's military forces exactly once in the past fifty years. This was the Iraqi war of 1991 annn
nd it lasted not quite six days.

During that same period, American soldiers have suffered through a mind-boggling variety of ambiguous, smaller-scale conflicts from Korea to Bosnia with stops along the way for Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Somalia and Haiti. This array of lesser but messy, politically charged situations often straddled the gray area between uneasy peace and something that wasn't quite war - Rwanda, El Salvador and Nicaragua to name a few more. Generically, these ill defined, constantly shifting forms of conflict can be termed Unconventional Warfare because they do not follow the conventions of military conflict. Unlike conventional war, they are not usually waged by the professional armed forces of a state, warring forces do not usually attempt to seize and hold terrain and sometimes they are not even waged for a specific reason

There is a wide variety of unconventional threats, many lumped together by the U.S. Department of Defense as MOOTW - Military Operations Other Than War. They include but are not limited to humanitarian assistance, insurgency and counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation, counterdrug operations, shows of force, nation assistance, ensuring freedom of air and sea navigation, peace operations, disaster assistance, recovery operations, strikes and raids and more.

Since MOOTW is such a broad, inclusive category, this essay uses the term "unconventional warfare" (UW) to separate out political-military activities such as peace operations and insurgency from purely military activities such as strikes, raids and shows of force.2 In this use, unconventional warfare consists of those military activities conducted within a conflict environment that are not an immediate part of conventional warfare or directly supporting it. It includes humanitarian operations, complex emergencies, insurgency and counterinsurgency, some forms of subversion, sabotage and similar activities. It is distinguished from conventional warfare chiefly by the fact that UW does not primarily seek to defeat or destroy enemy military forces in combat.

Conventional forces can easily conduct many MOOTW tasks, e.g. freedom of navigation missions or strikes and raids. However, some situations involve complex combinations of missions such as a peace operation, humanitarian or disaster assistance, nation assistance and perhaps even counterinsurgency, all

occurring at once in the same area, often in a highly politicized environment. The Haiti intervention of 1994 and 1991's Operation Provide Comfort (N. Iraq) are examples of such missions.

Despite the prevalence of MOOTW and its subcomponent, UW, conventional war remains the focus of attention for the U.S. Defense Department. The clearest evidence of this attachment to conventional warfare is a report issued by then- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili, in the fall of 1996. This took the form of a Joint Staff produced document called "Joint Vision 2010." Despite the title, "Joint Vision" did not attempt to anticipate the future in any substantial way.3 It did recognize the existence of a "a broad range of deterrent, conflict prevention and peacetime activities" and the comment is followed throughout the document by references to "full spectrum dominance".4 But "Vision 2010" presents a vision that has little patience with ambiguous threats. Instead, it offered a vision of information-enhanced conventional warfighting with technological superiority emphasized on nearly every page as the decisive element. In the report's Pentagon techo-jargon, the various cooo
omponents of technological superiority together create something called dominant maneuver, based on "precision engagement," defined as "..a system of systems" that allows US forces to locate and react to "the objective or target...generate the desired effect" and "re-engage...when required" 5

At the same time, the individual armed services quickly produced a series of reports, each promoting itself as essential to the Chairman's high-tech battlefield. The most notable of these was the Air Force report "Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force" published in November 1996.6 The report took an extreme position that, contrary to long held military doctrine, ground forces were not always essential to win wars. Allegedly, air forces, using the kind of high technology, precision strike methods seen in the Gulf War, could eliminate the need for large-scale ground forces. Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman was quoted as saying "those who assert that only ground forces can be decisive are clearly wrong." 7

The Army Version

The US Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer was less convinced that technological solutions were the final answer On 6 October 1996, General Riemer distributed a memo to the Army, warning against the "potential infatuation with precision engagement." "Too many people," he wrote, "are looking for the silver bullet, which makes war nice and clean and surgical. History shows that it doesn't exist..." The Chief later went on to repeat essentially the same comments in the Joint Forces Quarterly, a journal directed at senior officers of all the American military services.8
The Army's counterpart to "Joint Vision 2010" was "Army Vision 2010," an attempt to out-tech the other services with concepts like "battle space dominance" and "precision strike" enabling pin-point attacks with artillery and missiles. 9 The institutional Army apparently found it hard to come to grips with an ambiguous future and instead claimed a prominent role in the consensual high-tech future. The chief difference in the Army version was that it gave the dominant battlefield role to the Army.

Nor was this empty theorizing. The Army has been moving since at least 1992 to implement this vision as part of its Force XXI program. Most recently (1997) a series of trials were conducted called the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE). This was, however, an "experiment" in name only. Plans are already underway to field this equipment throughout the Army's combat forces within two years. 10 But, unlike the Joint Chief's "Vision" statement, "Army Vision" at least makes more than a bare nod toward the idea that something other than conventional warfighting is important. For the first time, it clearly identifies an explicit Army responsibility for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) secondary only to its responsibility to "fight and win the nation's wars." It is the only service to do so.

"Land force", Army Vision states "is also the force of choice to respond to natural disasters, assist communities during civil disturbances and perform civic action/ nation-building projects as required." This may seem a small concession but potentially at least it could be more than that. For the first time, there has been a clear statement at the highest Army level that MOOTW is not incidental to the real job of war-fighting but an important responsibility in its own right. Some commentators pointed to this as a revolution in Army thinking and an embracing of MOOTW.11 However, having said that MOOTW are important, "Army Vision" fails to follow through. In fact, it could be argued that the Army is moving away from MOOTW capabilities.

Briefly, the quality that makes conventional military units suitable for MOOTW is usually not their combat capability. It is their "incidental" and support capabilities (e.g. communications, transportation, aviation and logistics) and their manpower. AWE envisions smaller, tightly structured units maximized for high-tech "battle space dominance" and "precision strike" with a minimum of support elements. Such organizations will be severely handicapped in trying to carry out most forms of MOOTW.

The component of the U.S. military best prepared for these conflicts is the Special Operations Forces (SOF). These specially trained forces consist principally of Army Special Forces (SF or "Green Berets") and

Rangers, psychological operations (psyop) units, civil affairs (CA) units, Navy SEALs and Special Boat units, Air Force Special Operations Squadrons and the various organizations that support all these elements.

This essay argues that, even without AWE, the conventional warfighting forces of the United States are not the best military forces for such missions. These situations are characterized by lack of a defined enemy, the need for persuasion, negotiation and even community leadership. This might sound like a strictly civil development problem, but widespread disorder and the presence of significant violent elements ready and perhaps eager to use deadly force also characterize these situations. SOF, especially Army Special Forces, civil affairs and psychological operations units provide the combination of capabilities required for such situations. Where, then, do these forces fit in the "official" future?

THE ROLE OF SOF IN THE OFFICIAL FUTURE

"Joint Vision 2010" mentions "land, sea and maritime" and even "space forces" but not special operations forces. It's central theme of "dominant maneuver" used to control "battle space" may have application to something other than conventional warfighting, but if so, it is not explained. SOF's role in this scheme, by implication, is as an element of the conventional force.

"Army Vision," on the other hand, makes explicit mention of SOF, at least Army SOF. "Army Vision 2010" identifies seven mission "categories" including a total of 19 specific missions. Except for five that are identified as "technical" missions, all include SOF.

According to Army Vision 2010, future missions and capabilities look like this:

Missions and Required Army Capabilities

- Defending or Liberating Territory
MRC.....HVY/LT/SOF
LRC.....HVY/LT/SOF

- Punitive Intrusion
Counter Drug.....LT/SOF/TECH
Counter Terrorism.....LT/SOF
Counter Proliferation.....SOF

- Conflict Containment
MOOTW.....HVY/LT/SOF

- Leverage
TMD..... TECH
Space Applications..... TECH
C4I Systems Integration..... TECH
Battlefield Awareness.....TECH

- Reassurance
Presence.....HVY/LT/SOF

- Core Security
NMD.....TECH
Counter Drug.....HVY/LT/SOF
Illegal Immigration.....LT/SOF
Crime in the Streets.....LT/SOF

- Humanitarian
Disaster Relief.....LT/SOF
Population Evacuation.....HVY/LT/SOF
Refugee Protection.....HVY/LT/SOF

Cooperation, Exchanges & Trng.....HVY/LT/SOF
(Taken from DA, Army Vision 2010, p. 8)

This chart has interesting implications for special ops. First is the lack of SOF exclusive missions. Except for counter proliferation, there are no missions that belong to SOF. The chart treats them as a part of the conventional Army along with heavy and light forces. Another implication stems from the number of mission categories identified for "light" units.

As of 1998 there are ten active duty Army divisions. Of the ten, only four can reasonably be described as "light" - the 101st Airborne (Air Assault), the 82d Airborne Division, the 25th Infantry and the 10th Infantry (Mountain). The first is essentially a light infantry division but is tied to the brigade of helicopters that give it the "Air Assault" capability that is its raison d'etre. The long lead-time to move the helicopters and their heavy support requirements make the 101st a poor candidate for most "light" missions. Likewise, the 82d Airborne is considered a "signature" division, used in contingencies such as Desert Shield to demonstrate American resolve by quickly placing ground forces in a conflict area. As such it is also not available for most "light" missions. This leaves the 25th and the 10th Mountain as the only useable, readily deployable light units. Both of these are small, two brigade divisions. The large number of missions performed by conventional forces (especially the lighhh ht divisions) in the last decade has resulted in severe stress on these units. This "operational tempo" shows no sign of decreasing. Both light divisions have been stretched thin, employed whenever contingencies arise including Somalia, Haiti, natural disasters along the Pacific Rim, etc. Even when heavy forces are the principle element in an other-than-war mission, as in Bosnia, elements of the 10th are often attached.

The overlap between light and SOF missions can be viewed as offering more opportunities for SOF employment, which is certainly true. Bu this can also mean that SOF will fill in for the absent or very over-stressed light forces, i. e. the badly overworked 25th Infantry and the 10th Mountain. If the Army loses a light division, as seems possible given anticipated force reductions, the situation will only become worse.12 Since it is unlikely that Navy SEALs or Air Force combat controllers will be able to help with the abundant large and small-scale light infantry missions, this leaves the Army's numbered SF groups as the only candidates. Furthermore, because of their relatively small size and lack of elaborate support structure, SOF is inexpensive in comparison to ordinary conventional units. In Fiscal 1997, the total SOF budget for all services was less than 1% of the total U.S. defense budget. 13 This can increase the temptation to use these organizations rather than recreate conventional structure.

What comes out of this analysis, simply, is that international competition and threats from other actors will continue to require military responses from the United States. Conventional, "Clausewitzian" war is unlikely to disappear. It is an incredibly powerful tool. Indeed, it is to a large degree responsible for the nation-state's triumph as the dominant system of political organization in the world. While it is certainly true that new means of power are emerging, and that non-state actors have increased importance, none of this necessarily means that nation-states will become obsolete nor that the direct application of military force will become useless or even unimportant. High-tech systems and information networks remain susceptible to physical destruction. Conventional units, capable of "putting steel on target" will be an important component of power for the foreseeable future.

Although conventional war threats will not disappear, they are likely to be less important. In any case it is unlikely that an enemy will soon appear who has a military capacity equal to that of the United States. In short, there is less need for high technology systems, especially weapons systems. There is however, more need for a force that can be placed in harms way when the nature of that harm is unclear and the source of it may not be obvious.

Even a brief glance at the daily newspaper suggests that there is a lot of potential work out there for an unconventional warfare (UW) force. Indeed, only resources and national policy considerations limit the number and degree of possible involvements. Meeting those challenges will require a capability to conduct those poorly defined forms of engagement here termed UW or Unconventional Warfare. However, to maintain and improve this capacity will mean incurring expenses in areas where the Pentagon prefers not to spend its money - training personnel in non-military skills.

The future anticipated by the "Vision" statements; suggests that the vast array of unconventional, "gray area" engagements going on are of marginal importance. Other-than-war threats continue to receive the obligatory mention and nod from conventional planners but there's not much heart in it. They often go on to argue

that these are tasks that can be done by any well-trained soldier. It is odd to believe that the best choices to prosecute these conflicts are an 18 year-old high-school graduate with basic combat training and a military specialist course, commanded by 23 year-old officer who has completed a basic officer course and generalist training in some military field. There is a better way and that way is with unconventional warfare forces. Specifically, Army Special Forces, CA and psyop as the core element, supported by other SOF and conventional units as required.

FROM SOF TO UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The military organizations most capable of conducting UW, and the only organizations with a sustained record of success in UW are the Special Forces, civil affairs and psyop units that collectively make up the US Army Special Operations Forces. In order to maximize the ability of the SF/CA/PSYOPS team to act as an Unconventional Operations Force, it will be necessary to disentangle the current mix of SOF missions and separate out those which are conventional from those that are unconventional. Special Operations Forces currently (1998) have nine principal missions and seven collateral activities.

Missions

Direct Action (DA)
Special Reconnaissance (SR)
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
Unconventional Warfare (UW)14
Combatting Terrorism (CT)
Counterproliferation (CP)
Civil Affairs (CA)
Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
Information Warfare (IW)

Collateral Activities

Coalition Support
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)
Counterdrug Activities (CD)
Countermine Activities (CM)
Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
Security Assistance (SA)
Special Activities

(Taken from USSOCOM Fact Sheet, undated, provided courtesy USSOCOM December, 1996)

This list is a hodge-podge of conventional, unconventional and just plain odd missions, some of which are actually subsets of others. Unconventional warfare, as used in this list, is actually closer to guerrilla warfare. The list reflects a general willingness within the SOF community to accept almost any mission as one in which SOF can succeed. Many SOF commanders believe that, by accepting many missions, SOF demonstrates its fitness and remains competitive with other organizations in the struggle for a share of the diminishing military budget. This leads to the inclusion of things like demining which clearly is and ought to be a conventional military engineer mission. SOF, in particular Army SF, became involved because most demining activity in this context means instructing foreign military personnel in land mine and booby-trap removal.
The problem with things like demining is that they require significant amounts of training time to prepare the instructors and significant amounts of deployment time to conduct the training in what is essentially a duplication of an existing engineer capability. Other missions such as counterterrorism and special activities are so specialized or occur so rarely that they can realistically be accomplished by the small specialized joint service units (Special Mission Units) organized for the purpose and really should not concern the greater SOF community at all. Their inclusion as SOF missions serves only to lengthen the list of missions.

At least as explained in unclassified publications, counterproliferation is too vague to really allow anyone to focus resources on it. 15 It's inclusion seems to be intended to make a political policy point that the United States government opposes proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and will use "military power" to do so, when and if appropriate.

Still other missions, in which SOF has played a major role are not mentioned at all - for example Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. These are missions in which threatened US civilians and selected foreign nationals are removed from harm's way in situations such as the 1996 evacuation of Liberia.

Unscrewing the Inscrutable

Because, as noted earlier, the current mission list is a result of diverse influences (congressional legislation, bureaucratic fiefdoms, historical accidents, initiatives by the special operations community and so forth) and because some of those missions are vaguely defined, it is difficult to re-order them in a way that makes sense. What follows is an attempt to break apart the two chief types of missions that make SOF special and which result in much mission confusion.

Unconventional warfare missions include "special" activities that are not part of conventional warfighting. Army Special Operations soldiers supporting the creation of rural civil government in Haiti are carrying out an obviously "unconventional" mission of which ordinary soldiers would not be capable. This is what makes them "special" and unconventional.

The other group of missions is those that are more-or-less conventional activities but which are "special" because they are done at a very high level of proficiency and often in very difficult circumstances. A clear example of this second class of activity is that of the Air Force Special Operations Squadrons. When USAF special operations transports drop Army SF troopers, the basic difference between that and an ordinary drop of Army paratroopers is that the former is likely to occur in places or under conditions that would make an ordinary paradrop difficult or impossible. This makes them "special," but thoroughly conventional.

In the first case, unconventional warfare, it is the activities that are special. In the second case the missions are essentially ordinary conventional warfare activities, but it is the units that are "special" because of their unique equipment and high proficiency. Which missions are really special in the sense of different and which are those best carried out by a highly-trained conventional military force?

Building Unconventional Operations Forces (UOF)

Following the usage originated by Colonel Mark D. Boyatt, this essay now introduces the term Unconventional Operations Forces meaning those elements of US SOF most suited to perform unconventional warfare, chiefly Army SOF. 16 These are Army SF, psyop and civil affairs units supported by appropriate other elements. The long-standing practice of SF soldiers has been to regard civil affairs and psychological operations units as outside the "core" group of Special Operations Forces. Perhaps in some sense they are, but they are very important for most forms of unconventional warfare and therefore are "core" forces for Unconventional Operations Forces.

As Boyatt points out, the unconventional role consists in large part of assisting indigenous military and paramilitary forces in the conduct of a large slice of what are now considered SOF missions and collateral activities - foreign internal defense, guerrilla warfare, humanitarian assistance, nation-building and counter-drug missions. UOF then, are forces that "accomplish their mission through counterpart relationships. The only SOF specifically trained, organized and equipped to conduct these missions in this manner are the numbered Army Special Forces Groups." 17

Additionally, however, three of these roles: nation-building, guerrilla warfare and humanitarian assistance have a strong requirement for psyop and CA skills. Large-scale foreign internal defense missions would certainly benefit from CA and PSYOP participation and even counter-drug operations would find these capabilities useful.

Re-ordered Missions and Units*

1. Unconventional Warfare (UW)**- Army SF/CA/PSYOP

- Peace Operations (PO)
- Support to Insurgency (SI)
- Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
 --Security Assistance (SA)
 --Counterdrug (CD)
 --Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

2. Direct Action (DA) - Rangers, SEALs, SMUs, Conv Forces
- Raids, demonstrations, demonstrations of resolve
- Counter Terrorism (CT)
- Personnel Recovery Missions
- Countermine (CM)

3. Special Reconnaissance(SR)- Rangers, SEALs, SMUs
   Conv Forces

Collateral Activities

1. Special Activities including most classified national level missions - Rangers, SEALs, SMUs
2. Combat Search and Rescue - USAF Special Ops
3. Coalition Support - Conventional Forces***

General Support of SOF

1. Civil Affairs
2. Psychological Operations
3. Special Operations Aviation
4. USAF Special Operations
5. Navy Special Boat Units

* Information Warfare falls out as too poorly defined. As defined by USSOCOM, SOF counterproliferation missions("locate, identify, seize, destroy, render safe or transport WMD") are simply a special case of direct action. Combat Search and Rescue would become an Air Force Special Ops mission with assistance as appropriate by other SOF. For example, in areas where Army Special Forces were conducting UW, the SF would assist with downed-pilot or sensitive equipment recovery.

** Navy and Air Force SOF would provide some specialist training to their counterpart services in foreign nations as part of UW. Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Teams would remain a dedicated support asset of the Navy SEALs.

***Coalition Support, meaning liaison and confidence building would be accomplished by conventional forces. SOF, chiefly Army SF, if required, would carry out specialized training, as a form of security assistance.

Training Time

Now there is tendency, especially among those who like to call themselves common-sense thinkers, to say that all of the flailing about and confusion over definitions and mission categories is wasted energy. SOF, they might say, will continue to do whatever needs to be done. But, as usual, life is not so easy. Lack of appropriate training arose as an issue in both Operation Provide Comfort (N. Iraq) and Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti). It is one of the reasons for the sense of frustration some SOF members feel about unconventional warfare missions. Elementary psychology tells us that groups and individuals function better if they have a sense of mastery of their task(s). That mastery stems from some combination of native ability, training and experience. Since ability is hard

to select for in this case (because we don't have a good definition of what we are looking for) the variable we can control to produce mastery with the most certainty is training.

In many respects, the question of what SOF does or ought to do comes down to training time. To expect a single organization, no matter how talented, to undertake missions as diverse and complex as those assigned to Army Special Forces is to expect the impossible. Missions like CT, DA and SR are interesting and widely respected, therefore they receive an undue amount of attention, to the detriment of the time and resources needed for other missions - especially something as complex and convoluted as "unconventional warfare". Language training and maintenance alone is time consuming enough.

But, it's hard to decide exactly what that training ought to consist of. Should SOF train in communications, marketing, knife fighting, psychology or negotiation and light weapons handling? Likewise, area specific training is very important for UW. But what areas should we anticipate and prepare for? What languages should be emphasized? This very difficulty probably accounts for a large part the tendency for SOF to gravitate back towards traditional military tasks and the comfortable, conventional model of warfare.

The current military intelligence system simply is not set up to provide that kind of detailed information, especially not on short notice. Intelligence officers and special operators both complain about the difficulty in obtaining even basic information about many countries in the world where sudden contingencies arise. The cure is to give the numbered SF Groups a real, carefully considered, regional orientation and force them to stick to it in planning and deployments. But it also means they will not be available for the current, full range of SOF missions as defined in current doctrine. The difficulty of defining appropriate UW training goes back in turn to the lack of definition that bedevils the whole area of UW. No wonder it is easier to devote training time to weapons rather than, for example, negotiation skills.

Developing an Unconventional Warfare Force

Why doesn't SF embrace UW (per the author's definition) as its principal mission? In part for the reasons above, because it is very hard to define and prepare for. But there are cultural reasons as well. UW missions are too often dismissed as "social work." Since the Vietnam War, part of the problem is the attractiveness of DA, CT and SR as missions. Such missions and the resulting image of deadly resourceful fighters is a principal reason soldiers undergo the extraordinary hardships of special operations training and duty. These commando-like activities are close to the conventional model of warfighting and have great appeal and thus tend to consume a disproportionate amount of the unit's attention and training time. In the words of one former SF battalion commander, "They are high visibility, immediate gratification missions, well within the comfort zone and easily identified with by most people."

The same missions can be performed by other SOF and some general purpose forces such as Marine Corps Reconnaissance units. Some special ops units, such as Delta, the Ranger Battalions and SEALs are often better trained, organized and equipped for these missions than Army SF. This is duplication that is hard to justify in a shrinking military. Furthermore, UW and its associated missions are sufficiently difficult and complex to require all the training time and resources available.

Finally, the game of "anything you can do, I can do better" in conventional warfare is too competitive and results in duplication of capabilities, accompanied by endless fruitless arguments as to which of the similar capabilities is really superior. The US Marine Corps is a primary competitor with the Army's Ranger Regiment for a variety of contingency missions. The USMC is already upgrading its demanding initial entry training program ("boot camp") by adding an additional five days called "Crucible Week" making it more similar to Army Ranger training. 18 Despite success in the "social work" side of the SOF business, it is not always popular with the operators who do virtually all of this work, Army Special Forces. In November and December, 1994 a series of interviews were conducted among US fores in Haiti by researchers from the Army's Walter Reed Research Institute. These psychologists asked soldiers from all specialties and all ranks captain and below, how they felt about their work in Operation Uppp
phold Democracy. Of the 3,205 soldiers interviewed, 147 were Army SF. Forty percent of the SF interviewed did not feel the mission was appropriate or important as compared to 22 percent of military police and 23 percent of intelligence personnel who felt similarly.19

Not surprisingly, the SF soldiers feelings were most strongly duplicated in the other combat arms (infantry, artillery and aviation) in Haiti. If nearly half of the SF soldiers involved in a typical UW mission like Haiti did not feel that it was an appropriate SF mission, clearly there is considerable disagreement among operators as to what Army SOF, in particular SF, ought to do.

From SOF to UOF

Unconventional operations forces can allow the US to compete in the arena of not-quite-war that I have termed "unconventional warfare". In most applications it will have the added advantage in a media-soaked political environment of being conducted routinely enough, in a sufficiently low-profile manner to attract little press coverage.

The SOF community in general and SF in particular have a tendency to spread themselves too thin. In an admirable display of "can do" spirit, SOF units tend to disparage what they call "hand-wringing" and boast they can do "anything, anywhere, anytime." To some degree this is even true. However, the fact that a unit can manage to accomplish a task does not mean that it is the best-suited unit or that training for peripheral tasks is the best use of its time.

The special operation's heritage from Vietnam, with its emphasis on conventional offensive warfare, direct action and strategic reconnaissance has played the SOF community, especially Army SOF, false. Despite the appeal of Direct Action, Counter-terrorism and Strategic Reconnaissance, the fact is that these missions seldom occur and when they do, they are usually the province of SMUs. Historically we have seen that while Army SF can perform these missions, they are not its forte. In Panama, Somalia and the Gulf War these missions tended to be given to SMUs, who in turn produced the most successful record of accomplishment.

The same historical record has also shown that Army SOF has a solid, unduplicated record of success at unconventional warfare functions. In the Gulf, in Northern Iraq, in Somalia, Panama and in Haiti they performed mission and scored successes that no other type of organization, military or civilian, matched or could match. Army SOF is the only type of organization, SOF or conventional, with the training, equipment and organization to conduct most types of UW missions.

However, It will require a real change in thinking, at the national policy level, within the special operations commands and in the Department of Defense to allow SOF to make the changes required for the warfare of the 21st century. At the highest levels, it will require a change in strategic thinking and policy making to accept UW and "gray area" conflict as an important arena, not peripheral to national interests but one that can have important, long reaching effects on the U.S. and its partners and allies. Changes will be needed in the way we acquire, process and disseminate intelligence so that information
needed for UW decisions is timely and available.

For the Defense Department, it means a serious, long range investment in personal training and education in a time when technology and hardware solutions are far more popular. Technology can no longer be allowed to drive strategy as it has in the development of "battlefield dominance" concepts and "precision engagement." De-emphasis of technology means that any changes will likely be made without the support of the major industrial suppliers who stand to profit from high-tech approaches.

At the joint and major service command level it means a difficult and time consuming effort to develop systematic approaches to these conflicts and translate those approaches into useable doctrine that will guide force development and training. It means a willingness to allocate scarce intelligence resources to the analysis of UW problems.

For the Army, it will require both re-thinking and reorganizing Army SOF. For example, it is probably necessary to break out two styles of CA and psyop units. One type would be dedicated to becoming the commander's interface with the civilian community, the other would be oriented toward more traditional functional areas. Psychological operations units need to become more effective in leveraging their role as wide-purpose information sources, developing the capability to quickly and effective act as an information link between military forces and the increasingly civilian environment in which they operate.21

Each of the five current active duty Special Forces Groups would receive a dedicated civil affairs company of the first type and a dedicated psychological operations company. Both would be configured for SOF operations.22 Since these are small organizations, less than forty persons each, they could be manned by re-designating unfilled Special Forces positions within the existing SF groups. Such dedicated companies would also be able to maintain a clear geographic focus and develop habitual relationships with the SF groups.

The present 96th CA Battalion and 4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg, NC would remain general support assets serving the entire Army. Because these are unique and valuable organizations, they might eventually joint organizations supporting the entire DOD. To some extent this is already occurring.

Within Special Forces it will mean a willingness to place much less emphasis on the image and skills of the commando and much more on the ability to apply military, civil and psychological capabilities at the tactical and

operational levels.

Most importantly, for all of these groups and organizations it means a shift in expectations. For the most part, UW is devoid of clean solutions and clear victories. Nor is it usually rapid. This means a willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress. None of these adjustments will be easy. But all of them are necessary and important if the United States is to survive and prosper in the complex and dangerous environment of the 21st century.

NOTES

1. A few examples include: Huntington, Samuel P. Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security (N.Y.: Ballinger, 1982). Fuentes, Gidget" Not Like Yesterday/ From The Commander's Mouth To The Marines' Ears" Navy Times-Marine Corps Edition 19 Jan 1998, (comments of Gen. Charles C. Krulak, commandant of the Marine Corps) and Alexander, Yonah. "Is the worst yet to come?" Jerusalem Post - Internet Edition, Thursday, January 8, 1998, 11 Tevet 5758. Prof. Alexander is director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, Holon, Israel and Washington, D.C.

2. JCS Joint Pub 3-07, Military Operations Other Than War, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense) 1995, p. ix.

3. Shalikashvili, John M. (General), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Vision 2010" (Department of Defense, Washington D.C.) 07 November 1996.

4. Ibid., p. 4.

5. Ibid., p. 21.

6. Fogleman, Ronald L. (General) Air Force Chief of Staff, "Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force" November 1996.

7. Diamond, John. "Each Military Branch is Seeking to Promote its Future Importance" Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 November 1996, p.12. For an earlier example of this trend in Air Force thinking see the statement by then-Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice before the House Armed Services Committee, 20 Feb 1992, released by the US Department of the Air Force under the title "Reshaping for the Future." Courtesy Department of the Air Force, US DOD.

8. Reimer, Dennis J. (General), Chief of Staff of the Army, "Balancing Dominant Manuver and Precision Engagement: A Strategy for the 21st Century," Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 13-16.

9. Reimer, Dennis J., (General), Chief of Staff of the Army, "Army Vision 2010" (Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.) 13 November 1996, "the blueprint for the Army's contributions to the operational concepts identified in Joint Vision 2010."

10. "Spiral Development: Vital to Army's Future" US Army Training and Doctrine Command News Release, Fort Monroe VA, 1997, p. 2. Courtesy US TRADOC. General Reimer reiterated his faith in these concepts in remarks before the Institute of Land Warfare on 8 January 1998, Crystal City VA., sponsored by the National Military Industrial Association.

11. Preston, Patrick "Future Seizes Operations Other Than War" Army Times, 25 Nov, 96, p. 8.

12. As of 1998, the preferred alternative to losing a division seems to be reduction of existing division structure, reducing size and capability while still keeping the ten division "flags" in existence. This does not help solve the "op tempo" problem.

13. 1997 Joint Posture Statement - United States Special Operations Forces, U.S. Special Operations Command, McDill AFB, Tampa, FL. 1996

14. The U.S. DOD definition of unconventional warfare differs from the author's definition. Per the 1997 Joint

Posture Statement - United States Special Operations Forces: UW is "A SOF principal mission involving a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed, in varying degrees, by an external source. UW includes guerilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape."

15. See for example ibid., p. 31.

16. Boyatt, Mark D. (Colonel), "From SOF to UOF," Student Research Paper, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA, 1993, p. 7.

17. Boyatt, Mark D. (Colonel), US Army Special Forces, Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army Special Forces Command, personal correspondence with the author, 25 January 1997.

18. US News and World Report, "The Few, the Proud, the Smart, the Moral" 16 Dec 1996, p. 33)

19. Halverson, Ronald R. and Bliese, Paul D. "Determinants of Soldier Support for Operation Uphold Democracy" Armed Forces and Society, (Vol. 25 No. 1) Fall 1996 pp. 81-96.

20. This would have another advantage in that it would relieve the 96th CA Bn and the 4th POG from the need to maintain parachute qualified personnel or meet the other unique requirements of a special operations unit such as physical training.

21. The current (1998) operations of NATO's U.S. operated "Radio Mir" in countering anti-NATO propoganda in Bosnia is an early example of such operations.

22. This would also relieve the general support psyops and civil affairs units of the need to maintain some training overhead skills such as parachute qualification.